








Rethinking EU institutions’ rules of procedure 





How could EU institutions members validly meet 
and vote in time of COVID-19? What type of 
acts could they adopt? Have all adopted acts 
followed a valid procedure? These questions of 
crucial importance have attracted very little 
attention so far. From ensuring publicity and 
security of virtual meetings to finding valid 
methods for adopting acts, challenges posed to  
EU institutions were enormous. The COVID-19 
pandemic served as a real crash test for assessing 
the resilience of EU institutions’ internal 
procedures. The institutions had to adapt swiftly 
to uphold their decision-making capacity. While 
the ECB’s internal rules provide its bodies with 
handy procedures regarding teleconferencing, 
written procedures and remote voting, similar to 
what the European Court of Auditor’s own rules 
of procedures and implementing rules of the 
latter do foresee, all five other institutions faced 
troubles to cope with the circumstances. The 
following institution-by-institution brief analysis 
highlights some remarkable realities about those 
five institutions and the urgent need to rethink 
working methods, drawing on the lessons learned 
from the COVID-19 crisis. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
The European Commission’s rules of procedures 
did not foresee any procedure for 
teleconferencing, although the 2010 version of 
the rules of procedures invited the Commission 
to “adopt supplementary measures relating to 
[its] functioning (…) taking into account 
developments in technology and information 
technology”2. It is only on 22 April 20203  that the 
European Commission adopted a revision of its 
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rules of procedure to allow Commissioners’ 
participation in meetings “by means of 
telecommunication systems”. Concerning remote 
voting, the Commission’s rules of procedure did 
already foresee the adoption of acts by written 
procedure, “provided that the approval of the 
Legal Service and the agreement of the [relevant] 
departments (…) has been obtained”. If no 
member makes (and maintains) a request for 
suspension of the procedure up to the specific set 
time limit set, the text is considered adopted. In 
such circumstances, this procedure appears 
particularly useful. This is a similar procedure to 
the one used by the European Court of Auditors 
and to the Council’s “silent procedure”. 
However, this method seems workable only for 
certain institutions, or acts of minor importance. 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The European Parliament was certainly the most 
severely hit institution from an operational point 
of view. This is due to its size but also to the 
intrinsic activity of an elected assembly: debating. 
It came with no surprise that those online – 
video-streamed – sessions have drastically 
affected the functioning of the institution. The 
inherent characteristics of video conference 
pushed MEPs to keep their meetings as short as 
possible and limit the number of interventions. 
Inevitably, sessions presented a drastically 
reduced number of agenda items and votes (and 
so of amendments) compared to normal sittings. 
Moreover, the “catch the eye” and blue cards 
procedures were suspended in order to ease the 
running of plenary sessions. In addition, urgency 
made texts move as quickly and possible through 
the different adoption stages. All these elements 
made debates practically impossible. 
As the European Parliament’s rules of procedure 
do not foresee any written voting procedure (nor 
any rules governing teleconferencing), the main 
challenge was to find an alternative to the 
traditional “by show of hands” 4  voting system 
that would ensure MEPs could vote 
simultaneously, confidentially, securely and in 
sequence. The European Parliament can revise its 
rules of procedure by simple majority vote5 , but 
it is naturally not possible to vote such a revision 
if the latter is about how to organise a valid vote. 
Fortunately, the Bureau is entitled to take 
“financial, organisational and administrative 
decisions on matters concerning the internal 
organisation of Parliament” 6 . In order to allow 
possibilities of contesting the results, it agreed on 
a rather complicated and old-fashioned method. 
MEPs had – and still today have – to print out 
voting lists, fill them in with their name and vote, 
sign a solemn declaration on the ballot paper, 
scan or photograph them and send them back 
(using their official email address) for manual 
(turned automatic later on) counting by 
Parliament staff. Luckily, the rules of procedure 
foresee that the quorum7  is met by default. 
COUNCIL  
The Council’s rules of procedure were not 
designed to allow virtual meetings either. Travel 
restrictions made it difficult to reach the required 
quorum8  and therefore formal Council meetings 
could not be held9 . Next to a “silent procedure” 
which only concerns a few minor decisions, the 
Council’s rules of procedure foresee a written 
procedure for acts “of an urgent matter” or “in 
special circumstances”. The major sticking 
element was that the use of the written procedure 
required – for every single act – a decision taken 
by unanimity by the Council or COREPER. The 
challenge was to make the Council agree to revise 
the rules of procedures and lift this unanimity 
requirement, make the voting rule for the 
adoption of the Council act concerned applicable 
instead, and let COREPER decide on it, as it was 
the last body to be able to meet physically in 
Brussels. Although such revision formally only 
required a simple majority vote10, this proved to 
be a very difficult negotiation. The debate was 








deciding where the power would lie during the 
crisis: among the Permanent Representatives in 
Brussels, or in the 27 EU capitals. 
It ended up being a win for the diplomats, as the 
Council agreed on a temporary derogation11  for 
one month, renewable. Like any lifting of 
unanimity requirement, this is also a win for the 
proponents of the community method over the 
intergovernmental approach. The act concerned 
by the use of this procedure should however “be 
subject to prior political discussion by ministers, 
for example by informal videoconference, in 
order to ensure to the maximum extent possible, 
among others, national coordination, public 
transparency, and the involvement of national 
parliaments in accordance with the practices of 
Member States”. Some Member States 
understood this decision meant losing influence 
over the decision-making process. This explains 
why Hungary, Poland and Slovenia added a 
declaration12  emphasising the temporary aspect 
of the measure. 
As a result, the different Council configurations 
only held informal – publicly video-streamed 
when required – virtual meetings preceding 
formal decisions by written procedure. As for 
other institutions and internal bodies, security 
and bandwidth concerned limited the number of 
devices from which one could attend these 
meetings, and the type of information that could 
be exchanged (only unclassified, non-sensitive 
content). 
Doubts were raised concerning what type of act 
could be adopted through this procedure. The 
Council Legal Service13  took the position that the 
ordinary written procedure should be limited to 
the adoption of legal acts. As this is a procedure 
to vote, ‘atypical’ acts, on which the Council does 
not formally vote, fall out of its scope. It 
conceded an exception for “the approval of those 
Council conclusions which are a necessary step in 
an established process, like enlargement or 
European semester, or are part of a regular 
process, like annual conclusions on the EU policy 
towards different regions in the world. However, 
this should not be the case for one-off political 
texts. For these, the Council Legal Service 
advised to use “ministerial statements, prepared 
by COREPER in advance of ministerial VTCs”. 
Nevertheless, on the request of a number of 
Member States, COREPER decided to use the 
procedure for the approval of Council 
conclusions “on a case by case basis.” The 
European Council did not follow the same path. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL  
As the European Council’s rules of procedure do 
not foresee any rules for virtual meetings, all its 
virtual meetings were labelled as informal. Those 
rules do nevertheless foresee the possibility of 
casting written votes for decisions “on an urgent 
matter” 14 . However, all members need to agree 
unanimously to make use of this procedure. 
Unlike the Council, the European Council did 
not amend its rules of procedure, although it 
could have done so by simple majority – provided 
it would have agreed unanimously15  to hold the 
vote. 
After almost each meeting, European Council 
President Charles Michel issued “Conclusions of 
the President”, in default of European Council 
conclusions or decisions. The above-mentioned 
written procedure would have allowed the 
adoption of typical acts such as European 
Council decisions but leaders did not make use of 
it. Atypical acts, such as political acts (e.g. 
European Council conclusions), are – in line with 
the above-mentioned opinion of the Council 
Legal Service – not concerned by this procedure. 
The adoption of European Council conclusions 
is therefore theoretically only possible in ordinary 
physical meetings. The leaders did however adopt 
a “joint statement”16 after their virtual meeting on 
26 March 2020, although it is unclear what 
procedure they used. Could they avoid a formal 








it is the case, why not adopting European Council 
conclusions? Or is a joint statement an ‘atypical’ 
atypical text, adopted informally? To note that 
the absence of European Council conclusions 
made possible to avoid all the intense and detailed 
negotiations that usually precede and take place 
during a summit. This new type of meetings 
unexpectedly put President Michel “in an 
unusually assertive position” 18 . 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
The CJEU made full use of existing written 
procedures and of e-Curia19 . Nevertheless, some 
decisions have highlighted the lack of concrete 
reflection on the openness of the CJEU in the last 
years. Although some authors20  have called for 
the use of, for instance, online streaming of 
hearings, the CJEU has still not taken a step in 
this direction. In pandemic circumstances, this 
would have proven to be particularly useful. As 
hearings have – in principle – to be public21 , all 
hearings scheduled until 25 May were postponed. 
The CJEU was not ready for remote public 
hearings. The same problem appeared in two 
other types of situations. First, the new 
Advocate-General Richard de la Tour took oath 
remotely on 23 March22 . The ceremony did not 
take place publicly, although required by both the 
Statute of the CJEU and the Court of Justice’s 
rules of procedure. Second, several judgments 
and opinions of Advocates-General were waiting 
to be delivered. This led the President of the 
Court of Justice to deliver alone in bundles 
several judgments, in an empty courtroom, 
accompanied by an Advocate-General that did 
the same for opinions. The President of the 
General Court did the same for his court. Despite 
the fact that these judgments and opinions were 
made immediately available online, their delivery 
should have been made in open court. This crisis 
might speed up efforts to improve the (remote) 
openness of the institution. 
TO SUM UP: AN URGENT NEED TO 
RETHINK THE WORKING METHODS 
This brief analysis shows that some institutions 
made full use of existing exceptional procedures, 
while some others accelerated the 
implementation of new rules or urgently created 
new ones. Some rules have been breached; others 
extensively interpreted. It is a fact that many rules 
need to be adapted, modernised or created. 
Existing rules cannot be stretched forever. 
Virtual meetings often ended up with participants 
speaking at each other instead of with each other, 
one after the other in a pre-established order. 
Keen observers of the EU institutions will see a 
tendency to go back to ‘business as usual’ as soon 
as possible. The claim that there should be a 
“before” and an “after” COVID-19 certainly also 
applies for the EU institutions’ rules of 
procedure. The revamped single seat debate for 
the European Parliament is only the top of the 
iceberg. In most institutions, the temporary or 
pragmatic solutions found are not ideal to ensure 
a smooth functioning but also accountability. EU 
institutions need to find more sustainable, 
adequate and carefully thought through 
procedures. They would benefit from exchanging 
best practices among each other but also with 
national and international institutions, and 
rethinking their working procedures. This should 
go hand in hand with an appropriate revision of 
transparency rules. These have not changed, and 
COVID-19 was not an excuse23  to bypass them. 
However, they should be – where relevant – 
adapted to the new working methods. Lobbying 
strategies have adapted more rapidly. The 
upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe 
might constitute a timely opportunity to draw 
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